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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
By FRANK T. BECKER* AND RICHARD W. HAY**
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Among the most common criminal procedure questions
dealt with by federal and Kentucky appellate courts are those
that pertain to search and seizure. In this Survey year, the
predominant search and seizure issue concerned the scope of
"standing" to assert violations of the fourth amendment and
thereby invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule.1 The
importance of the constitutional principles underlying the ex-
clusionary rule was another area of emphasis this year, as the
Kentucky Supreme Court overturned the convictions of guilty
defendants rather than interpreting facts so as to avoid that
drastic result.
A. Standing to Assert Fourth Amendment Violations
It is not enough that evidence has been illegally obtained
for it to be inadmissible. The exclusionary rule protects only
the personal rights of one who is the target of an unreasonable
search and seizure.2 Entitlement to raise fourth amendment
objections traditionally was thought of in terms of "standing."
In Jones v. United States,3 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant has "automatic standing" if the crime charged was
possession of the items seized or the defendant was legiti-
mately on the premises searched.4
* J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
1 The exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states by reason of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
3 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Prior to Jones, the federal Courts of Appeals established rules for standing to
assert fourth amendment protection which "generally required that the movant claim
either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial
possessory interest in the premises searched." Id. at 261. In its Jones decision, the
Court reasoned that the prosecution of possession offenses presented a special prob-
lem. Without automatic standing, a defendant would be forced to establish standing
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By 1978 the Court had abandoned the notion of "stand-
ing" in favor of an inquiry into whether the defendant had "a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place."5 Dur-
ing the period since Jones, the rationale for the "automatic
standing" rule also has become outmoded." However, before
the United States Supreme Court had occasion to specifically
reconsider the validity of Jones in the context of a possessory
offense, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Rawlings v.
Commonwealth.7 In that case, the defendant Rawlings was
charged and convicted of the offense of possession of con-
trolled substances for the purpose of sale. Rawlings and four
other persons were present in the residence of Lawrence Mar-
quess. Police officers entered the residence to arrest Marquess
pursuant to a warrant. After detecting the odor of marijuana
smoke in the house, they detained the other occupants, for-
bidding them to leave unless they consented to a body search,
while other officers obtained a search warrant. When the of-
ficers who had procured a warrant for the search of the house
returned forty-five minutes later, one occupant, Vanessa Cox,
was ordered to empty her purse. Upon doing so, a large quan-
tity of LSD and other drugs was discovered. Rawlings told the
officers that he was the owner of the drugs, whereupon he was
by testifying to facts which would be sufficient to convict him. Thus, the defendant
faced the dilemma of relinquishing one constitutional right, the right against self-
incrimination, against another, the fourth amendment right. Additionally, without
automatic standing, the prosecution would be allowed to assert the contradictory po-
sitions that the defendant had no possession for standing purposes, but had posses-
sion for conviction purposes, a situation the Court found to be "not consonant with
the amenities . . of the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 263.
1 Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83, 92 (1980).
' In the 20 years which have lapsed since the Court's decision in Jones, the
two reasons which led the Court to the rule of automatic standing have
likewise been affected by time. This Court has held that testimony given by
a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evi-
dence of his guilt at trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 ...
(1968). Developments in the principles of Fourth Amendment standing, as
well, clarify that a prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy,
assert that a defendant charged with possession of a seized item did not
have a privacy interest violated in the course of the search and seizure.
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 88-89.
7 581 S.W.2d 348 (Ky. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980).
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searched. A knife and $4,500 were found on his person. Rawl-
ings moved to suppress the evidence, contending that Cox's
purse was not within the area of search described in the war-
rant, which was Marquess' house.
The trial court overruled Rawlings' motion to suppress
the drugs, money and statement made to the police on the
ground that Rawlings lacked standing to contest the search.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed on different
grounds, holding that Rawlings had standing but that no
fourth amendment violation occurred because the police had
probable cause to arrest the occupants after smelling mari-
juana smoke. The Kentucky Supreme Court considered the
case on discretionary review and affirmed, again on different
grounds. The Court held that Rakas v. United States" "seems
to reject the [automatic standing] theory of Jones," and thus
the sole inquiry was whether Rawlings had a legitimate or rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the purse in which the drugs
were found. "Considering the totality of the circumstances,"
the Court held, "the search did not violate Rawlings' legiti-
mate or reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion into the purse," 10 and thus his substantive fourth
amendment rights were not violated, 1 even assuming the evi-
dence was seized illegally.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
8 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
9 581 S.W.2d at 349-50.
10 Id. at 350.
" Another Kentucky case decided before the United States Supreme Court was
faced with a Jones-type case (after the apparent erosion of the reasons underlying the
automatic standing rule) was Commonwealth v. Bertram, 596 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980), which held that "the 'automatic standing' aspect of Jones ... does not
appear to have any application to cases arising in this jurisdiction." Id. at 380-81.
It is interesting to note that, at the time of Bertram, there may have existed
some question whether the Simmons rule (against use of pretrial suppression hearing
testimony on the issue of guilt) was weakened by Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights admissible to impeach).
However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals cited a Kentucky case, Shull v. Common-
wealth, 475 S.W.2d 469 (1972) for the proposition that a defendant's pretrial "testi-
mony may not thereafter be admitted against him at the trial on the issue of guilt
unless he fails to object." Id. at 472. Thus, the Jones rule was discarded completely in
Kentucky while a reason for its vitality in the federal system was still at least
arguable.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Rawlings and issued its opinion in that case 12 during the
Survey year along with its decision in another case involving
fourth amendment issues, United States v. Salvucci.13 In
Salvucci the Court stated: "Today we hold that defendants
charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits
of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated. The automatic standing rule of
Jones v. United States . ..is therefore overruled."1 4
The Court addressed the lack of need for the Jones rule
thusly: "The 'dilemma' identified in Jones, that a defendant
charged with a possessory offense might only be able to estab-
lish his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving
self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his
guilt, was eliminated by our decision in Simmons. .... "I
In Rawlings, the United States Supreme Court articu-
lated the factors which led to its affirmance that the defen-
dant possessed no legitimate expectation of privacy in
Vanessa Cox's purse. Foremost would appear to be "a frank
admission by petitioner that he had no subjective expectation
that Cox's purse would remain free from governmental intrus-
tion."16 Other factors included the fact that Rawlings "had
never sought or received access to her purse prior to that sud-
" Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
S 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
14 Id. at 85.
" Id. at 89. See also note 6 supra (no danger of prosecutorial self-contradiction
remains).
Justice Marshall's dissent noted, however, that Simmons did not address
whether pre-trial suppression hearing testimony would be admissible for impeach-
ment purposes. "Simmons, therefore, does not eliminate the possibility that a defen-
dant will be deterred from presenting a Fourth Amendment claim because of 'the risk
[, if he chooses to testify,] that the words which he utters may later be used to in-
criminate him." Id. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The question arises, assuming Justice Marshall's belief is correct that such testi-
mony could be used in federal courts to impeach, whether such a use would be proper
in Kentucky. Under the Jett doctrine (see Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788,
792 (Ky. 1969)), a defendant's prior statement which is inconsistent with trial testi-
mony is admissible for substantive purposes as well as for impeachment. Thus, under
Bertram, 596 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), it would appear that a defendant could
testify contrary to his pretrial position without fear that his statements could be in-
troduced, unless, the Jett doctrine notwithstanding, the court were to allow the prior
statements to be introduced for the limited purpose of impeaching credibility.
" Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 105.
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den bailment;' 17 he had no "right to exclude other persons
from access to Cox's purse;"' 8 and "the precipitous nature of
the transaction."' 9
Rawlings' ownership of the drugs did not create a reason-
able expectation of privacy, but the Court stated that owner-
ship was a fact to be considered in making such a determina-
tion.2 0 The Court noted that Rakas had "rejected the notion
that 'arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the
ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment."2'
From this it follows that to assert a fourth amendment claim,
a defendant must have an expectation of privacy in the place
searched, not the object seized. Why ownership of the seized
object is a "fact" to be considered is unclear. It does not ap-
pear from the language in Rawlings that the inquiry should
ever embody any determination of privacy interest other than
in the place searched.
B. Search and Arrest Without a Warrant
The limited constitutional power of the police to search
or arrest a suspect without a warrant was reiterated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Martin v. Commonwealth,22 and
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Waugh v. Common-
wealth.23 A threshold issue in Martin was whether the arrest
of the defendant, which elicited the confession sought to be
suppressed, was based on probable cause. 4 Partially on the
basis of the confession, the jury convicted Martin of the stran-
gulation murder of a 93 year-old woman.
Shortly after the woman's body was found, investigators
received a call from an anonymous informant, who told them
17 Id.
1 Id.
29 Id.
20 Id. at 105.
21 Id. at 105.
22 592 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1979).
23 605 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
24 Martin v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.2d at 137. The central issue in the case
concerned the voluntariness of the confession. However, if the arrest had been illegal,
the confession could properly be suppressed if it was the product of the illegal arrest
despite the fact that it was given voluntarily. Id.
1980-81]
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to "check out Martin, because 'he was in town and he was
AWOL," in need of cash and knew the old woman.25 Without
ascertaining the reliability of the informant or the truth of the
allegations, police officers began to search for Martin and
eventually found him under a bed in a friend's apartment.
The police informed Martin that he was being apprehended
for being "AWOL," and, after reading him his Miranda
rights, took him to the police station. Military authorities
were not notified, although Martin was jailed for twenty-four
hours before being questioned. After confessing to the murder
"Martin was then 'arrested' for the murder and taken before a
magistrate.
26
On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
police were not authorized to "arrest" or "apprehend" Martin
for being absent without leave, a military offense. 7 The ques-
tion, then, was whether there was probable cause to arrest
Martin for desertion, an offense for which civil officers are em-
powered by Congress to arrest.28 Probable cause did not exist,
the Court held, as the arrest was based on a tip from an anon-
ymous informer. Probable cause, under Kentucky law, must
be based "upon information gained through a reliable inform-
ant, coupled with some type of verification of the informa-
tion. ' 29 Neither factor was present in this case; the arrest was
therefore illegal. The Court held that the confession elicited
by the arrest should have been suppressed as a fruit of the
illegality.
Perhaps as important as the Court's holding are the
statements by Justice Lukowsky as to the reprehensible con-
duct by the police officers in this case. Justice Lukowsky
stated that the actions of the police "had that 'quality of pur-
posefulness' which is the target of the exclusionary rule."30
The importance of this case lies in the fact that as great an
injustice as the workings of the exclusionary rule has in a case
21 Id. at 136.
28 Id. at 137.
27 Id. at 138.
28 Id.
29 Id. (emphasis in original).
30 Id. at 139.
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such as this where the conviction of a cold-blooded murderer
is reversed, the Kentucky Supreme Court has expressed the
attitude that it will not stretch the facts to comply with the
technical requirements of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments to circumvent the exclusionary rule, "no matter how
unpalatable that action may seem."31
A similar result was reached by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in a case involving a warrantless search, Waugh v.
Commonwealth.32 In Waugh, an anonymous telephone caller
informed a detective that the defendant was to be at a shop-
ping mall at 9:00 p.m. to sell drugs. The detective knew the
defendant "because of previous arrests on drug-related
charges. '3 3 The detective observed the defendant at the mall
around 9:30 p.m., saw him place a phone call, then saw him
turn and walk away from the detective when Waugh noticed
him. Officers stopped and searched the defendant, found 20
tablets of morphine, and then placed him under arrest.3 '
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the Fayette
Circuit Court should have suppressed the evidence because
the search was not based on probable cause.35 The Court
stated the rule that probable cause can be based on informa-
tion received through a reliable informant.3 6 Where the in-
formant is unknown, however, the tip must be "reasonably
corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge"
which are obtained pursuant to an investigation.37 The mere
presence of the suspect in the mall when it was open to the
public was not sufficient corroboration, nor was the fact that
he made a phone call.38 The act of Waugh in merely turning
away from the officer "was not sufficient to constitute flight or
furtive action."39 In Waugh, therefore, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has expressed the same attitude that the Kentucky
31 Id. at 140.
22 605 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
11 Id. at 44.
34 Id.
"3 Id. at 46.
31 Id. at 45.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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Supreme Court expressed in Martin. Neither court will, with
the benefit of hindsight, interpret the facts to find probable
cause to justify a search or seizure where an anonymous in-
formant's tip is insufficiently corroborated and where, aside
from the caller's information, only speculation of illegal activ-
ity exists.
II. CONFESSIONS
The most litigated issues concerning the admissibility of
incriminating statements made by defendants in custody are
whether the statements were voluntarily made and whether
the defendants waived their rights under Miranda v. Ari-
zona.40 Recent Kentucky decisions have dealt with both of
these issues.
A. Voluntariness of Confessions
To be admissible against a defendant, a confession must
be voluntary.41 This requirement is based upon the due pro-
cess clause of the federal constitution,42 and it represents
three distinct concerns. First, coerced confessions may be un-
reliable indications of guilt.43 Second, coercion intrudes upon
the free choice of the defendant to assert his fifth amendment
right to remain silent.44 Third, the use of a coerced confession
to convict a defendant rewards police misconduct.45 The re-
cent Kentucky cases indicate that only the first rationale con-
cerns the Kentucky courts in determining the admissibility of
confessions.
In Tackett v. Commonwealth,6 the Kentucky Supreme
Court reiterated the previously established rule that mental
confusion and intoxication at the time of the confession do
not, per se, render it involuntary.47 In Tackett the Court up-
"0 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11 E.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42 Id.
43 McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 148 (2d ed. 1972).
44 Id.
45 Id.
41 No. 78-SC-397-MR (Ky. Sept. 11, 1979) (unpublished memorandum opinion).
47 Id., slip op. at 9.
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held the trial court's findings of voluntariness because the tes-
timony of the investigating officer showed that the defendant
was coherent and alert at the time of her confession and
understood the meaning and effect of her statement. In
Silverburg v. Commonwealth,4 after the accused in custody
was told he failed a polygraph, he made an incriminating
statement. Again, the Kentucky Supreme court held the state-
ment admissible as voluntary.49 And in Johnson v. Common-
wealth,50 the Supreme Court held a statement made after the
police promised the defendant that he would not be subject to
the death penalty to be voluntary.
In each of these cases the Supreme Court appears to be
exclusively concerned with the reliability of the confessions
and not with the other rationales behind the exclusionary rule
as applied to confessions; that is, whether a knowing and in-
formed waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights was made
and whether the police acted coercively. This is in contrast to
decisions by other courts and to previous decisions by the
Kentucky high court. For instance, some courts have held that
in certain circumstances a defendant's intoxication renders in-
effective his apparent waiver of rights.51 The United States
Supreme Court 2 and previously the Kentucky high court53
have taken a particularly dim view of coercion by implied
threats or express or implied promises of leniency. Silverburg,
Johnson, and Tackett evidence a trend away from due pro-
cess concerns in determining the voluntariness of a confession.
B. Waiver of Miranda Rights
One recent Kentucky decision has dealt with the waiver
of Miranda rights by an accused in custody. In Douglas v.
48 587 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1979).
49 Id.
50 No. 79-SC-511-MR (Ky. April 22, 1980) (unpublished memorandum opinion).
51 E.g., Logner v. North Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968); Commonwealth v. Walker, 368 A.2d 1284 (Pa. 1977).
512 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
53 Devine v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1953) (relying on Ky. REV.
STAT. § 422.110 [hereinafter cited as KRS]); Commonwealth v. Mayhew, 178 S.W.2d
928 (Ky. 1944).
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Commonwealth,54 the defendants, after being given their Mi-
randa rights, stated they did not wish to make statements.
Approximately ten minutes later, an officer who was present
at the time the right to silence was invoked asked the defen-
dants where the victims' wallets were located. As the officer
turned away, one of the defendants stated where the wallets
could be found. 5 The Kentucky Court of Appeals, citing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. Mos-
ley,5 held that the statement was properly admissible, be-
cause, according to the court, Miranda does not indefinitely
prohibit further questioning.5 7 However, reliance on Mosley
probably was misplaced. The Supreme Court in Mosley em-
phasized two factors that were decisive in validating the inter-
rogation in that case: the significant period of time between
the initial invoking of the right and the second interrogation,
and the repetition of the Miranda warnings prior to the sec-
ond interrogation. 8 Neither factor was present in Douglas.
The Supreme Court in Mosley noted that the mandate in Mi-
randa that "the interrogation must cease"59 when the person
in custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent does not
mean either that the questioning must cease forever or that
interrogation may resume after a momentary respite.6 0 Doug-
las appears to validate re-interrogation after what can only be
characterized as a momentary respite. 1
54 586 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1979).
" Id. at 18.
5 423 U.S. 102 (1975).
586 S.W.2d at 18.
423 U.S. at 106-07 (1975).
364 U.S. at 473-74.
60 432 U.S. at 102.
el What is to be considered "interrogation" was recently addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Court held
that the term interrogation means express questioning or its functional equivalent;
that is, "words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 301.
In a later case, the United States Supeme Court determined that the "interroga-
tion" need not be conducted by the police, but the use of a paid informant in an
accused's cellblock was sufficient to violate the accused's sixth amendment rights.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
[Vol. 69
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III. FRUSTRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A fundamental concept in American criminal justice is
that an accused shall not be "punished for exercising [a con-
stitutional right]. 62 However, because of the contemporane-
ous objection rule6 3 and the harmless error rule,6 over-zealous
prosecutors 5 frequently are successful in frustrating the effec-
tive exercise of defendants' right to silence following arrest.6
A. Contemporaneous Objection Rule
1. Appellate Review
In Doyle v. Ohio,67 the United States Supreme Court held
that the fourteenth amendment prohibited a prosecutor from
using an accused's post-arrest silence as a tool for impeach-
ment." The Court stated that it was implicit in the Miranda
62 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
63 Failure to object to a ruling or action by a trial court "at the time the ruling or
order is made or sought" effectively waives any error which the court commits. Ky. R.
CRiM. P. 9.22 [hereinafter cited as RCr]. This rule applies to "[v]iolations of constitu-
tional rights the same as [violations] of other rights." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 450
S.W.2d 244, 246 (Ky. 1970).
" "Any errors, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded." RCr 9.24. This rule has often been the subject of judicial
criticism: "We must be careful lest the purgatory of the harmless error doctrine erode
our sacred constitutional rights." United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1014
(5th Cir. 1979).
6" Several recent cases deal with improper prosecutorial references to defendants'
exercise of their constitutional rights. E.g., Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275,
278 (6th Cir. 1979) ("remind[ed] the jury [in closing] . . . that the defendant had not
taken the stand"); Scott v. Commonwealth, No. 79-SC-549-MR (Ky. May 13, 1980)
(unpublished per curiam opinion) (defendant's refusal to consent to search men-
tioned during examinations); Carter v. Commonwealth, No. 79-SC-452-MR (Ky. May
13, 1980) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (prosecutor elicited from police officer
that defendant "refused to waive his Miranda rights, refused to make a statement,
and requested a lawyer"); Hockenbury v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1978)
(prosecutor referred in closing to defendant's post-arrest silence).
66 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
67 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
66 Id. at 619. Shortly before Doyle, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: "The
efforts of the prosecutor to impeach each appellant by reference to his silence at the
time of identification and at the time of arrest plainly violated the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent." Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Ky. 1976).
However, the Court in Niemeyer affirmed the appellants' convictions on the ground
that "the errors and irregularities were not prejudicial." Id. at 222.
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decision "that silence will carry no penalty."6 9
In Carter v. Commonwealth,"0 the prosecutor, in his di-
rect examination of the investigating officer, brought out the
fact "that the appellant refused to waive his Miranda rights,
refused to make a statement, and requested a lawyer. '71 The
Kentucky Supreme Court summarily disposed of this issue on
appeal, stating: "The appellant made no objection; conse-
quently, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. '72
While a strict application of the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule is called for upon review of certain types of errors at
trial, 3 Kentucky decisions recognize that at least some degree
of inquiry into the merits of the effect of errors which frus-
trate constitutional rights is necessary to prevent "manifest
injustice. 7 4 Where, as in Carter, the constitutional infringe-
ment is the result of deliberate attempts of a prosecutor to
usurp those rights, a greater degree of protection than that
afforded by the "manifest injustice" standard76 is needed.
Where a defendant sustains actual prejudice by such a viola-
tion, the contemporaneous objection rule serves only to facili-
tate prosecutorial misconduct and thwart the defendant's
right to a fair trial.
77
" 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
No. 79-SC-452-MR (Ky. May 13, 1980) (unpublished per curiam opinion),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Carter v. Kentucky, 49 U.S.L.W. 4225 (March 9,
1981). The United States Supreme Court reversed because the trial court refused to
give an instruction requested by the defendant which would have admonished the
jury not to consider his failure to testify on his own behalf.
" Id. slip op., at 3.
72 Id.
71 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-90 (1977).
74 Without a contemporaneous objection, appellate courts in Kentucky will not
reverse a conviction "unless the prejudice was so apparent and so great as to result in
a manifest injustice." Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Ky. 1974).
11 Such conduct by a prosecutor has been widely condemned. E.g.. Niemeyer v.
Commonwealth, 533 S.W.3d 218 (Ky. 1976):
No one except for the judge himself is under a stricter obligation [than is
the prosecutor] to see that every defendant receives a fair trial .... We
consider this to be an inexcusable example of abuse by a public prosecutor.
Officially, publicly, and as a word of caution to other similar officers, we
disapprove of and condemn it.
Id. at 222.
7' See 433 U.S. at 88-90.
For an analogous example of a court's disregarding a rule which might bar
[Vol. 69
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2. Habeas Corpus Review
Due to the existence of the contemporaneous objection
requirement as a basis for upholding convictions despite con-
stitutional violations, the federal courts are extremely limited
in their ability to grant habeas corpus relief. This is so despite
the fact that Kentucky appellate courts make some inquiry
into the merits of an appellant's constitutional claim to deter-
mine if manifest injustice exists.
Where a state appellate court reviewed the merits of a
claim of constitutional error and affirmed the conviction, a
federal district court can grant habeas corpus review where
that state determination is "plain error. ' 78 Where the state
court refused to address the merits of a claim, due to the de-
fendant's failure to comply with a state procedural rule for
preserving that error, 9 federal habeas corpus review of the
merits is precluded, absent a showing of "cause" for the non-
compliance with the procedural rule and "prejudice" to the
defendant.8 0
The third and most "difficult situation is created when
the court has arguably done both,"'81 that is, made some re-
view of the merits and refused to reverse on procedural
grounds. Because Kentucky's manifest injustice exception re-
quires some form of review, this third situation represents the
majority of the cases. Hockenbury v. Sowders82 is illustrative
of this situation.
In Hockenbury, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with review of a habeas corpus action in which the fed-
reversal in situations involving persistent prosecutorial misconduct, see text accom-
panying notes 111-13, infra.
78 See. e.g., Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, rehearing denied, 633 F.2d
443 (6th Cir. 1980).
7' An example of such a failure is noncompliance with the contemporaneous
objection rule.
80 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977). The previous rule, rejected in
Wainwright, "allow[ed] federal habeas corpus review, in spite of a defendant's failure
to comply with the state's contemporaneous objection requirement, unless the defen-
dant had attempted a 'deliberate bypass' of the state court procedure." 620 F.2d at
112.
620 F.2d at 115.
82 Id. at 111.
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eral district court found that certain questions and comments
by the prosecutor were impermissible under Doyle v. Ohio 3
Even though no objections were made to the statements and
questions during the trial, the federal district court found
they constituted "plain error" 84 and granted the writ for
habeas corpus. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that "the
District Court erred in making an independent assessment of
'plain error' rather than deferring to the state court's applica-
tion of its contemporaneous objection requirement."8 5 The
Sixth Circuit held that "where the state court has arguably
given more than one reason for the denial of petitioner's claim
. . . the federal court must determine whether the petitioner's
failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection require-
ment was a substantial basis of the state court's denial of
petitioner's claim,"8 6 and, if so, utilize the "cause" and
"prejudice" test.
The unusual aspect of Hockenbury is that the review of
the merits of the constitutional claim by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court was not merely a separate inquiry, detached
from the procedural question. As the Sixth Circuit recognized,
the constitutional review for "manifest injustice" was a
threshold issue which "must be made in order to determine
whether to apply the procedural rule or review [further] the
merits. '8 7 Thus, the question whether a defendant's constitu-
tional rights were violated to the extent that manifest injus-
tice resulted must be answered in the negative prior to invo-
cation of the procedural rule. It would appear that a federal
district court ought to be empowered to review that constitu-
tional determination for "plain error," and if it determines
83 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
s' See 620 F.2d at 113.
" Id. at 113-14.
86 Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 116 (emphasis added). In Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 501
(Ky. 1974), the Court noted that a review of the impact of a constitutional violation
should precede the implementation of the contemporaneous objection rule: "No ob-
jections were made at the trial to the closing argument. That being the case, any
impropriety in the argument would not be ground for reversing the judgment unless
the pejudice was so apparent and so great as to result in a manifest injustice." Id.
at 504 (emphasis added).
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that "manifest injustice" resulted, grant habeas corpus relief.
This is so because "an adequate and independent procedural
state ground" 88-the contemporaneous objection rule-could
not have been a "substantial basis" for denial of the defen-
dant's claim but for the erroneous constitutional determina-
tion. In fact, under Kentucky's approach, the procedural rule
is not "independent" of the constitutional review at all, but
very dependent on it, 89 despite the frequent failure of our ap-
pellate courts to properly articulate the connection.
B. Harmless Error Rule
The United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Califor-
nia,90  held that the fifth amendment prohibited any
prosecutorial comment about the defendant's failure to take
the stand. This prohibition is a constitutional protection also
applicable to the states.9 1 Such prosecutorial misconduct was
present in Eberhardt v. Commonwealth,92 wherein the prose-
cutor, during his closing argument, reminded the jury "indi-
rectly but emphatically that the defendant had not taken the
stand in his own defense. ' 93 An objection to this impermissi-
ble comment was sustained, "however, no cautionary instruc-
tion was given and a subsequent motion for a mistrial was
denied."9
The Kentucky Supreme Court held it was not clear
" See 620 F.2d at 113.
'" See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 633 F.2d 443, 445-48 (6th Cir. 1980) (order deny-
ing rehearing) (Keith, J., dissenting).
90 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
91 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). See also KRS § 421.225 (1972),
which states: "In any criminal or penal prosecution the defendant, on his own re-
quest, shall be allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not
be commented upon or create any presumption against him." Id.
92 No. 75.1120 (Ky. Nov. 12, 1976) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
13 Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1979). The remarks in
question were: "What other witnesses could the defendant's case have put forward
who were totally available to you? What other witness? Ask yourself that question.
Who else could have testified in this case?" Id. (emphasis in original). The prosecu-
tor then "gestured" or "pointed" toward the defendant. Id.
"' Id. A recent Supreme Court case held that failure to give a "no inference"
instruction on this issue, if requested, is error. Carter v. Kentucky, 49 U.S.L.W. 4225
(March 9, 1981).
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"whether the prosecutor in his closing argument, had made
remarks which were 'reasonably certain to direct the jury's at-
tention to the defendant's failure to testify,' but even if he
had, any error was 'nonprejudicial.' ,,5 This finding was over-
turned three years later in Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher,"'
wherein the Sixth Circuit listed several factors which it con-
sidered in determining "whether the error was . . . harmless,
given the evidence against the defendant and taken in the
context of the trial as a whole.""" Those factors included "the
repeated nature of the prosecutor's comments"; 9 whether the
case "was such that 'honest, fair-minded jurors might very
well have brought in not-guilty verdicts' ;99 whether the case
against the defendant was ".overwhelming and undisputed";
100
whether "the error could reasonably be viewed as eradicated
by the ruling of the trial judge, his admonition to counsel, and
instructions to disregard"; 101 and "whether the trial was oth-
erwise relatively error-free."102 The court noted that these
guidelines, plus "the fact that harm is presumed to have
flowed from constitutional error"10 3 are of help in determining
the issue of harmless error. In weighing these factors, the
court observed that the prosecutor's comments were brief and
not repeated, but, "while weighing in favor of a finding of
harmless error, 1 0 4 this factor alone was insufficient to prove
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
It could be argued that a violation of a constitutional
right always prejudicially affects substantial rights. This posi-
tion appeared supported by Bennett v. Commonwealth,0 5
wherein the Court held: "Where the accused's constitutional
rights are violated it is not necessary for him to show prejudi-
9 605 F.2d at 278.
go Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 279.
9Id.
200 Id.
101 Id.
02 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. The Court noted: "[I]t only takes a single comment... to remind a jury
that the defendant has not testified." Id.
5 309 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1958).
[Vol. 69
1980-81] SURVEY-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
cial error resulted. The mere violation of his constitutional
rights is sufficient to work a reversal in a criminal case."106
It appears clear, however, that this proposition since has
been rejected by the Kentucky 07 and United States Supreme
Courts. In Chapman v. California,s the Supreme Court "de-
clined to adopt any such [automatic prejudice] rule,"109 but
did state that "prior cases have indicated that there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infrac-
tion can never be treated as harmless error."111 However,
where prosecutorial misconduct results in deliberate frustra-
tions of constitutional rights, the better approach is that
adopted ten years ago by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Flannery."" That court, expressing a "sense
of futility" from prosecutors' persistent disregard of its previ-
ous admonitions against such misconduct, stated: "[H]ereafter
...we shall not endeavor to weigh prejudice, but shall rule it
prejudicial as a matter of law." 1 2 The court noted only one
possible exception to its automatic reversal rule:
If the court interrupts the argument, instructs the jury fully
101 Id. at 186.
107 The case under discussion, Eberhardt, clearly shows this. See also Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590, 593-94 (Ky. 1977); Stiles v. Commonwealth, 570
S.W.2d 645, 647 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
109 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
109 Id. at 21-22.
110 Id. at 23. The Court gave three examples of "constitutional rights so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction never [could] be treated as harmless error." Id. Those
cited concerned coerced confessions, the right to counsel and the right to an impartial
judge. Id. n.8.
One could also add the right of the defendant "to present his own witnesses to
establish a defense," which is found in the sixth amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). In Washington, the Supreme Court
found that the right was so fundamental to a fair trial that it was incorporated in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95
(1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court reversed a case where this right was denied,
even though there was "overwhelming evidence of guilt, offset only by a bare allega-
tion of prejudice." Id. at 99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This interpretation of Webb,
"that there are some constitutional violations to which the harmless error rule does
not apply," is supported in United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1976); and United States v.
Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973).
451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971).
112 Id. at 882.
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on the defendant's constitutional right not to testify and the
jury's obligation not to draw unfavorable inferences and, in
addition states to the jury that the U.S. Attorney was guilty
of misconduct, we may find no prejudice; otherwise we will
reverse.
113
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Burks v. United States114 "held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from re-
trial following reversal of a conviction on the ground that the
evidence produced at the trial was not sufficient to justify
submitting the charge to the jury."1 5 Commonwealth v. Bur-
113 Id. The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.
1980), while "declin[ing] to adopt as strict a rule" as in Flannery, stated it was "be-
ginning to experience a similar sense of futility from the persistent disregard of prior
admonitions as was experienced by the First Circuit." Id. at 112. The court further
stated:
[I]n. .. an unpublished order, we called attention to ... United States v.
Buege .... cautioning prosecutors about the use of improper arguments
which draw even subtle attention to the failure of a defendant to testify.
We cautioned against the use of terms such as "undisputed" and "uncon-
tradicted" by the prosecutor in the case of a nontestifying defendant. It was
pointed out that it is an area where the administration of justice will be
served by avoiding arguably as well as blatantly improper comments. The
final line of the order cautioned that continued failure to heed the admoni-
tion of this court would demonstrate that the admonition was ineffective,
calling, therefore, for summary reversal.
Id. at 112.
See also Darnell v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977), where the prose-
cutor commented on defendant's pre-trial silence. In dissent, Justice Lukowsky said:
I am compelled to conclude that prosecutors are deliberately disregarding
[our] teaching[s] . . . in the hope of finding salvation in the harmless error
doctrine. In other words, they are more interested in obtaining a conviction
than in obtaining a conviction that will stick.
The time has come for us to take a more prophylactic approach. We should
exercise our supervisory authority over the lower courts of Kentucky and
hold that whenever this error is committed it will result in reversal and a
new trial.
Id. at 596. In Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978), the Court
stated: "While we have not yet reached the point where we think it necessary to
invoke the prophylactic rule suggested by our brother Lukowsky ... we must admit
our patience is wearing thin." Id. at 532.
214 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
"' Crawley v. Kunzman, 585 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Ky. 1979). "[A]s Mr. Justice
Douglas correctly perceived . . . it should make no difference that the reviewing
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ris116 brought "Kentucky law in[to] compliance with the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Burks."
1 17
In Burris, the jury found the defendant guilty of robbery.
Subsequently, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.118 The Commonwealth
appealed the judge's action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
"made a reassessment of the evidence produced at Burris'
trial and decided the trial judge erred in granting judgment
n.o.v.; the judgment was reversed with direction to let the ver-
dict stand."'1 9 The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the
trial judge acted within his authority and his determination of
insufficient evidence "was functionally equivalent to a verdict
or judgment of acquittal."12 0
The "functional equivalent of acquittal" doctrine also
provided a state constitutional basis for the holding.12 1 Rely-
ing on section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, which pro-
vides that "the commonwealth may not appeal from a judg-
ment of acquittal in a criminal case,"1 22 the court held "that
the Commonwealth was barred from securing appellate review
of the judgment n.o.v.
'1 2
3
The next logical step would be to find that the double
jeopardy clause barred retrial where there would have been
insufficient evidence to uphold a guilty verdict but for the
state's use of inadmissible evidence. 2' The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, however, in Phillips v. Commonwealth,1 2 5 decided
court, rather than the trial court, determined the evidence to be insufficient ..
437 U.S. at 11 (emphasis in original).
128 590 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1979).
117 Phillips v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), made the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause applicable to the states.
118 This motion was under authority of CR 50.02, made applicable to criminal
proceeding through RCr 13.04.
11 590 S.W.2d at 878.
,20 Id. at 879.
2I See 437 U.S. at 17.
122 Ky. CONST. § 115.
123 590 S.W.2d at 879.
12, This conclusion was reached in two other states. See Commonwealth v.
Funches, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (Mass. 1979); State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 999 (Utah
1979).
125 600 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
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otherwise. In Phillips a witness called by the Commonwealth
refused to answer any questions concerning statements which
incriminated the defendant that he had made to an investi-
gating officer. The Commonwealth then called the police of-
ficer, who testified, over objection, about the statements made
by the witness to him. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found
that this use of testimony did not come within the Jett doc-
trine126 and was "inadmissible because of the lack of opportu-
nity for cross-examination. 1 27 However, the court would not
accept the defendant's contention that a new trial was pre-
cluded under Burris because the evidence remaining would
not have supported a conviction. 12  The Phillips opinion
places Kentucky within the majority view. 29 Although Phil-
lips did not give any reasons for the rule adopted, there are
strong policy reasons to support the holding.13 0
126 See Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788, 792 (Ky. 1969).
127 600 S.W.2d at 486.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978); Morton v.
State, 397 A.2d 1385 (Md. 1979); State v. Boone, 393 A.2d 1361 (Md. 1978); Ex parte
Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 (W.
Va. 1979).
130 As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Wood, 596 S.W.2d 394
(Mo. 1980):
The prosecution in proving its case is entitled to rely upon the rulings of
the court and proceed accordingly. If the evidence offered by the State is
received after challenge and is legally sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused, the State is not obligated to go further and adduce additional evi-
dence that would be, for example, cumulative. Were it otherwise, the State,
to be secure, would have to assume every ruling by the trial court on the
evidence to be erroneous and marshall and offer every bit of relevant and
competent evidence. The practical consequences of this would adversely af-
fect the administration of justice, if for no other reason, by the time which
would be required for preparation and trial of every case.
Id. at 398-99.
